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RECENT CASES
A-iL.NCy-DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIORi-LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL IN
TORT AcioN WHERE AGENT Is NOT AT FAuLT-Infant was struck and injured
by automobile truck owned by corporation and driven by its employee. Infant
and father bring an action against corporation and its employee for the personal
injuries to the child and for the expenses and losses caused thereby incurred by
the father. The basis of the action was that the employee was liable for his
negligent act, and the corporation was responsible for its servant's negligence.
The lower court charged the jury that if defendant employee was, at the time of
the accident, acting in the scope of his employment, and was guilty of the negligence which was the proximate cause of the injury, then the corporation would
be responsible as master for his acts, and that it was their duty to decide whether
or not defendant employee was engaged in the work of the defendant corporation
at the time of the accident. The jury returned a verdict holding the defendant
corporation liable, but finding that there was no cause of action against defendant
employee. Defendant corporation appealed on the ground that the verdict and.
judgment entered thereon were contrary to law. Held, that judgment was reversed, since the verdict in favor of the driver being by necessary implication a
declaration by the jury that he had not been actionably negligent, the verdict
against defendant corporation was inconsistent, as a matter of law, its liability
being based solely on the acts of its employee. Hummers et al. v. Public Service
Electric & Gas Co. et al., 151 At. 383 (N. J. 193o).
This case is both interesting and important because it is apparently a reversal
by the New Jersey court of the theory upon which it had previously based its
decisions. For a discussion of the general principles involved, see comment on
Bennett v. Eagleke, 148 AtI. 197 (N. J. 193o) in (1929) 78 U. OF PA. L.

REv. 9o4.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RETROACTIVE "GuEsT AcT'-A CAusE OF AcrboN
IN TORT AS A PROPERTY RIGHT-In 1927, the Connecticut Assembly passed the
so-called "Guest Act"' whereby in case of accident the driver of an automobile
was not liable to a guest for negligence. In 1928, the plaintiff, a guest in a car,
was injured by the negligence of the defendant driver. In 1929, the "Guest Act"
was held invalid because the governor had not signed the act within the prescribed period after the adjournment of the assembly. Thereafter a validating
act' was passed, giving full effect to the "Guest Act" as of the time it was
passed in 1927. Held, that plaintiff can recover for defendant's negligence, since
the validating act could not have such retroactive effect as to impair plaintiff's
IPublic Acts of Conn. 1927, Ch. 3o8. This act as prospective legislation
was held constitutional in Silver v. Silver, 28o U. S. 1:7, 50 Sup. Ct. 57 ('Ogi-c).
See (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 556.
Public Acts of Conn. 1929 (Sp. Sess.) cc. i-s.
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property right in his cause of action. Siller v. Siller et u.e., 15I Atl. 524 (Conn.
193o). Pomznak v. EvIushek, 151 At. 526 (Conn. 193o).
Neither the Federal Constitution' nor most of the State constitutions4
expressly forbids retroactive legislation. The general rule, however, is said to
be that the deprivation of property by retroactive legislation is in violation of
the "due process" clause,' which is found in all constitutions. Courts, however,
are by no means agreed on just what is "property"' within the prohibitions of
the "due process" clauses. This conflict is especially manifest where, as in the
instant case, the right involved is the right to redress for a tort.7 Some courts
hold that such a cause of action is property within the constitutional limitation,.
others that it is not property,' still others distinguish between torts to the person
and torts to property 0 Courts in resorting to the word "property"' conceal
the real ratio decidendi, the exact nature of which is only determinable from an
investigation of the cases. There is one line of cases which might be termed
the "amnesty cases". All these deal with situations where, in the course of the
Civil War, torts had been committed by soldiers for which subsequent legislation
attempted to prevent recovery. Most courts, including the United States Supreme Court, held such legislation valid on the ground that a right of recovery
of this kind is not property." The underlying reason, however, seems to be that
the courts thought the public benefit from such legislation outweighed the indi' Ex post facto laws are forbidden, U. S. CoNsT., Art. I, § 9, cl. 3 and Art. i
§ 1O, cl. i; but this prohibition is limited to criminal legislation, Calder v. Bull,
3 U. S. 386 (1789).
' There are express prohibitions of retroactive laws in the constitutions of
Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Tennessee,
and Texas. See Note (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 478, 482 n. 6.
'U.
S. CoNsT. 14th Amend., ".
. nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
Smith, RetroactiveLaws and Vested Rights (1926) 5 TEx. L. REv. 231.
7
Womach v. St. Joseph, 201 Mo. 467, IOO S. W. 443 (1907) ; see Dunlop v.
Tol. Ry., 5o Mich. 470, 474 (1883) ; cf. International Co. v. Edmundson, 2=
S. W. 181 (Tex. 1920) (plea of privileged communication); Plummer v. Northern Pac. Ry., 152 Fed. 2o6 (C. C. W. D. Wash. i9o7) (plea of contributory negligence). But cf. Carson v. Gore-Meenan Co., 229 Fed. 765 (D. Conn. 1916).
'Angle v. Chicago Ry., 151 U. S. 1, 14 Sup. Ct. 240 (1894) (inducing
breach of contract); Johnson v. Jones, 44 Ill. 142 (1867) (illegal arrest and
false imprisonment); Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370 (1863) (false imprisonment) ; Kay v. Pa. Ry., 65 Pa. 269 (187o) (personal injuries) ; see Dash v. Van
Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 494 (N. Y. 1811).
'Drehman v. Stifle, 75 U. S. 595 (1869) (forcible entry and detainer);
Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 405, 9 Sup. Ct 763 (i88g) (trespass de bonis
asportatis) ; Wall v. Chesapeake Ry., 290 Ill. 227, 125 N. E. 20 (1919) (death) ;
Bailey v. School Dist., lo8 Wash. 612, 185 Pac. 81o (1919) (personal injuries).
11Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 IT. S. T4. 33 Sup. Ct. 428 (1913).
'For interesting discussions on whether such a right is a chose in action,
cf. Elphinstone, What Is a Chose in Action (1893) 9 L. Q. REV. 311, with Williams, Is a Riqht of Action in Tort a Chose in Action (1894) 1O L. Q. REv. 143.
"ZHess v. Johnson, 3 W. Va. 645 (1869) ; Drehman v. Stifle; Freeland v.
Williams, both supra note 9. Contra: Johnson v. Jones, supra note 8; Griffin
v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370 (1863) ; Terrill v. Rankin, 2 Bush 453 (Ky. 1867).
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vidual harm that might result." Closely related to these cases are what might
be called the "ratification cases". These deal with legislative attempts to relieve
The United
officials from personal liability for acts done without authority'
States Supreme Court upholds such legislation on the theory that an act which
a legislative body may at one time authorize an official to perform, may be ratiThus no longer does that
fied by that body after the act has been performed.'
Court base its decision upon the mere assertion that a cause of action in tort is
not property. A third line of cases is the "statutory-rights cases". These arise
under situations where liability in tort is incurred because of a statute, and subsequently retroactive legislation is passed denying such liability. As in the other
two groups of cases, courts in reaching a desired conclusion say that the right
The real basis of decisions denying recovof recovery is" or is not property'
ery, however, seems to be that since liability was created by legislative discretion because of supposed public benefit, it can similarly be done away with by
From this general survey it appears that the validity of such
legislation.'
retroactive legislation is not to be based upon a hard and fast rule,8 but rather
should be made to depend on the nature of the particular set of facts before the
court. ° In the instant case, when the plaintiff was injured, he immediately
acquired a cause of action which was based on fundamental common law principles." No special public purpose would be served in making the act retroactive
which would outweigh the possible harm it might do to the plaintiff and others
in his situation. Also, it can hardly be very seriously maintained that the public
has relied upon the "Guest Act", as originally passed in 1927, in such a way as
to necessitate that the validating act should be given retroactive effect.
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tractor's surety bond given to the County of Northampton as obligee, provided
that the contractor and surety were bound to the Commonwealth of Pennsyl""In plain English public policy regards that the plaintiff and other loyal
citizens, whose rights of person and property had been outraged, should submit
to the loss rather than that the country should suffer the 'ills untold' which were
arrested by 'the Amnesty Act'." Franklin v. Vannoy, 66 N. C. I45, 153 (1872).
" Generally, such retroactive legislation is upheld, Tiaco v. Forbes, 228
U. S. 549, 33 Sup. Ct. 585 (1913) ; Charlotte Ry. v. Welles, 26o U. S. 8, 43 Sup.
Ct. 3 (1922) ; cf. Forbes Boat Line v. Board of Com'rs, 258 U. S. 338, 42 Sup.
Contra: Hubbard v. Brainard, 35 Conn. 563 (1869).
Ct. 325 (922).
"Charlotte Ry. v. Welles, supra note 14 at I1, 43 Sup. Ct. at 4.
" Ertor v. Tacoma, supra note io.
'Bailey v. School Dist.; Wall v. Chesapeake Ry., both supra note 9:
McSurely v. McGrew, i4O Iowa 163, x18 N. W. 415 (1908).
1 See Collet v. Alioto, 290 Pac. 438, 44o (Cal. 1930).
"Constitutional principles must leave some play to the joints of the machine." Forbes Boat Line v. Board of Com'rs, su/pra note 16 at 340, 42 Sup. Ct
at 326.
1 "It is true also that when rights are asserted on the ground of some technical defect or contrary to some strongly prevailing view of justice, courts have
allowed them to be defeated by subsequent legislation and have used various
circumlocutions," ibid.
"Dickerson v. Connecticut Co., 98 Conn. 87. 118 Atl 518 (i922); Note
(1925) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 86.
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vania for the use of the county and any other person interested. It also provided that anyone furnishing materials to the contractor should have the right
to intervene and be made a party in an action instituted by the county, subject
however to the priority of the claim and judgment of the county, or upon the
failure of the county to start an action, to bring action in his own name. Plaintiff furnished materials to the contractor who failed to pay for them, and
plaintiff brought an action on the bond against the surety. Held, that plaintiff
could maintain the action. Portland Sand & Gravel Co. v. Globe Indetnnity
Co.,' I5i Atl. 687 (Pa. I93O).

The leading Pennsylvania case on third party beneficiaries, Blymire v.
Boistle,a which decided that a creditor beneficiary could not recover, contained
this significant dictum,' "Where one person contracts with another to pay money
to a third, or to deliver over some valuable thing, and such third person is thus
the only party in interest, he ought to possess the right to release the demand,
or to recover it by action." This intimation that a donee beneficiary could
enforce the promise if it was made for his benefit primarily, has been quoted
with approval by Pennsylvania courts on several occasions,' but no general
tendency to incorporate it into the law of Pennsylvania manifested itself until
the case of Brill v. Brill,' in which a donee beneficiary' was permitted to re8
cover on a contract made for his benefit.' The court in that case said, "If . . .
the promise to pay to the third party is not for the benefit primarily of the
other party to the contract but for that of the third party himself, the latter
has a legal or equitable interest in the contract which enables him to enforce
rights thereunder." The principle of law thus laid down was the basis of the
decision in the case qf Tasin v. Bastress' which was decided soon afterwards,
but the court in the later case of Greene County v. Southern Surety Co." re-

"The bond in this case was given in accordance with the Act of May ir,
x911, P. L. 244, which does not give materialmen the statutory right to maintain an action. It must not be confused with bonds given under the Act of
May 31, 1911, P. L. 468, amended by the Act of May i6, 1921, P. L. 65o, PA.
STAT. Supp. (West, 1928) § 19207, which does give materialmen the statutory
right to maintain an action. See Corbin, Third Party Beneficiaries in Pennsylvania (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. Ray. i, ig.
'6 Watts 182 (Pa., 1837).
'Ibid. 184.
' See Kountz v. Holthouse, 85 Pa. 235, 237 (1877) ; Adams v. Kuehn, 1I9
Pa. 76, 85 (I888).
I282 Pa. 276, 127 Atl. 840 (1925).

OAlthough this appears to be a case of creditor beneficiary rather than
donee beneficiary, the court treated it as the latter. See Note (1928) 76 U. oF
PA. L. REV. 594, 6o2.
'In the early cases in which a beneficiary was permitted to recover, the
court always added an additional basis for recovery besides that of intention
to benefit the third party. For a discussion of the various grounds of recovery,
see Note (928) 76 U. oF PA. L. REv. 594.
' Brill v. Brill, supra note 5 at 279, 127 At. at 841.
'284 Pa. 47, 130 Atl. 417 (925).
2292 Pa. 304, 141 Atl. 27 (I927).
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fused to accept it. Although the decision in Greene County v. Southern Surety
Co." is sound " even under the rule of Brill v. Brill' the court, reviewing the
cases in a laudable attempt to evolve a definite statement of the law, came to
the conclusion that a donee beneficiary could recover only when the consideration for the promise was the transfer of money or property to the promisor,
or where unusual circumstances were present.
In the principal case it was
not necessary for the court to decide whether this was a correct statement of
the Pennsylvania law. The court permitted the plaintiff to maintain his action
because the contract expressly gave him the right to sue thereon. It is obvious,
that as to such a contract, it is immaterial whether the third party is a donce
or creditor beneficiary, since in each case his right to maintain an action arises
from the express stipulation in the contract. While the principal case has not
clarified the law as to whether a beneficiary for whose benefit a contract is
made can maintain an action upon the contract, its practical importance is great,
in that it indicates a manner of insuring the beneficiary's right to maintain an
action.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTORY GRANT OF PRIVILEGE op ANcILLARY
AnMINiSTRATrON LiIrnED TO REsiDENTs-Claimant, a resident of New York,

had a claim against decedent for injuries received in an automobile accident in
Vermont. Decedent was a resident of New York and executors were appointed
there. Claimant seeks an injunction from New Jersey court restraining defendant New Jersey bank from transferring certain shares of its stock, held in the
name of decedent, until claimant could obtain ancillary letters, for purpose of
enabling her to bring an action against the estate as permitted to creditors under
a New Jersey statute.' Held, inter alia, that the statute granted right to ancillary administration only to resident claimants. Potterv. FirstNational Bank of
Morristown et al., 151 At. 546 (N. J. I93a).

In the recent case of Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co." the United
States Supreme Court upheld the right of a state to make a distinction between
privileges granted residents and those accorded non-residents where such differentiations were based upon "rational considerations". There, a statute limiting
U

Supra note io.

The bond in this case was intended primarily for the benefit of the county,
and to insure the proper completion of the work.
Supra note 5.

*' The inclusion of the phrase, "Or where unusual circumstances are present," indicates that the court did not succeed in its effort to bring certainty
to the law of third party beneficiaries.
13

N. J. ComP. STAT. (i91)

p. 3823, § 29: . . . if any executor or adminis-

trator of a non-resident decedent shall neglect for a space of sixty days after
the death of such decedent to make application in this state for letters testamentary upon or in respect to such decedent's estate, then upon the application of
any person alleging himself to have any debt or legal claim against such decedent . . . the surrogate may issue letters of administration to such person as
he may select . . ."
2279

U. S.377. 40 Sup. Ct. 355 (1929).
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the right to sue a foreign corporation in the New York courts for personal
injuries received outside the state to residents of New York was held not in
violation of the Federal Constiiution.' Limits to the "rational considerations"
which may justify such discriminaton in favor of residents are indicated, however, by such a case as Blake v. McClung,' where a Tennessee statute giving
priority to residents over non-residents in the distribution of assets of an insolvent foreign corporation was held a violation of the same constitutional provision.5 Apparently, a preference as to the essential substantive right to recover
is prohibited,' but a preference merely as to the instrumentality or procedure by
which an admitted right may be enforced will be supported if apparently justified
by considerations of public policy.' In most jurisdictions, a non-resident claimant, equally with residents, may claim under ancillary administratiun where such
administration has actually been granted.' The statute in question, as interpreted
by the court, merely provides that non-residents may not institute proceedings
for such administration, but must look to the domiciliary administration or to
some jurisdiction where ancillary administration exists on the estate. No question of priority as to a substantive right being presented,' the rule in Douglas v.
New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. applies and the privilege may be refused to nonresidents where principles of policy seem best served thereby. Here, there are
ample reasons for such preference: (i) the purpose of ancillary administration
in such a case being to enable residents more conveniently to press their claims"'
-non-residents being able to claim with equal convenience against the domicil' U. S. CoNsT., Art. IV, § 2. In the Douglas case, "manifest reasons for
preferring residents in access to often overcrowded courts, both in convenience
and in the fact that, broadly speaking, it is they who pay for maintaining the
courts concerned" were the "rational considerations" cited as leading to this
result.
I172 U. S. 239, i9 Sup. Ct. 165 (i898) ; Note (i929) U. OF PA. L. Ruv.
100I.

'Ibid. 258, "If such legislation does not deny . . .privileges and immunities of citizens, it is difficult to perceive what legislation would effect that
result."
'Blake v. McClung, supra note 4; In re Standard Oak Veneer Co. 173 Fed.
io5 (E. D. Tenn. i9o9); Amer. and British Mfg. Co. v. International Power
Co., 173 App. Div. 319, 159 N. Y. Supp. 582 (i9i6). See Corfield v. Coryell,
4 Wash. C. C. 371, 38o; Fed. Cas No.

at 551.

'Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., supra note 2; Loftus v. Penn-

sylvania R. Co., io7 Ohio St. 352, 14o N. E. 94 (1923).
'McKee v. Dodd, 152 Cal. 637, 93 Pac. 854 (i9o8) ; Hopper v. Hopper, 125
N. Y. 400, 26 N. E. 457 (i89i) ; Bird v. Key, 8 Baxt. 366 (Tenn. 1875) ; 2
WHARTON, CONFUCr OF LAWS (3d ed. i9o5) 1376. Some early cases refused

to allow non-residents to claim under the ancillary administration: Williamson
v. Furbush, 31 Ark. 539 (1876) ; Barry's Appeal, 88 Pa. 131 (1878) (holding
that non-resident may not so claim if his domicile is the same as that of decedent).
'But under the older cases holding that a non-resident may not claim under
ancillary administration even where it is already in existence (ibid. note 8) there
would, if the domiciliary estate were insolvent, be such a priority and Blake v.
McClung would apply.

1
0Hensley v. Rich, i9i Ind. 294, 132 N. E. 632 (192i) ; Hunt v. Fay, 7 Vt.
170 (835).
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iary estate, there is no necessity for it where, as here, there are no resident
claimants,' and (2) a divided administration, with its attendant expense, is to
be avoided wherever possible.'

CoRPoRATIoNs-NEcEssITY

OF PROPER

MOTIVE

IN

DEMAND 1Y

SHARE-

R.coRDs-Petitioner, a shareholder in
the corporation of which respondents are the officers, demanded that he be
allowed to inspect all the books, accounts and papers of the corporation. The
demand was refused and petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to allow him an inspection at any reasonable time. Respondents, in
answer, allege that petitioner's desire to inspect is prompted by an improper
purpose. There was a demurrer to this answer on the ground that a state
statute gives an absolute right of inspection to shareholders' and that, consequently, the motive for an inspection could not be inquired into. Held, that
demurrer be overruled, as good faith and a proper motive are essential before
a shareholder can secure the aid of a mandamus to compel the corporate officials
to allow him to inspect the records. Dines et al. v. Harris, 291 Pac. 1024
HOLDER FOR INSPECTION

OF CORPORATE

(Colo., 1930).

The examination of corporate books and records by a shareholder was
allowed at common law only when the shareholder proved that his desire to
inspect was prompted by a proper motive.' The determination of what constituted a proper purpose or motive was subject to the discretion of the court in
each particular case.3 In general, however, English courts held that an inspection would be allowed only when there was a specific dispute or controversy
concerning the corporation in respect of which dispute the examination became
necessary.' In the United States the courts were not so rigid, the general rule
1i; re Gennertes Estate, 96 App. Div. 8, 89 N. Y. Supp. 37 (1904) ; GooD-

op. cit. supra note 8, 1376.
47 N. W. 790 (189o) ; Goodrich,

RIcH, CO NFLICT OF LAWS (1927) 412; 2 WHARTON,

' In re Estate of Washburn, 45 Minn.

242,

op. cit. supra note 11, 413.

I CoLO. Come. LAWS (1922) § 2267 "It shall be the duty of the directors or
trustees of every corporation, . . . to cause to be kept . . . correct books
of account of all its business, and any stockholders in such corporation shall
have the right, at all reasonable times, to inspect and examine all the books,

accounts and papers of the corporation . . ." A majority of the states have
similar statutes, see N. Y. CoNs. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1930) c. 6o, § io. In
Pennsylvania the right is given by the constitution and is limited to railroad
and canal corporations, PA. CONsT. art. 17, § 2.
v. Walker, 9 Mich. 328 (1861); State v. Einstein, 46 N. J. L. 479
'People
(1884); King v. Merchants Tailors' Co., 2 B. & Ad. 115 (1831); HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES (3d ed. i896) § 310; 6 THoMPSoN, CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 4552.
1 State v. Middlesex Banking Co., 87 Conn. 483, 88 AtI. 861 (1913) ; Klotz
v. Pan-American Match Co., 221 Mass. 38, io8 N. E. 764 (1915).
'King v. Merchants Tailors' Co., supra note 2; In re Burton Co., 31 L. J.

Q. B. 62 (186) ;

BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (1927

§ 164.
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being that examination would be allowed if the purpose was relating to the
shareholder's interest as such, and was not inimical to the interests of the corporation.' In many states statutes have been passed relating to the rights of a
shareholder to inspect the corporate books and records. While these statutes
vary slightly in phraseology, most of them are of the same import as the
statute in the instant case. Courts are not in harmony as to the effect to be
given these statutes. A number of courts have held that snch statutes confer
an absolute right of inspection, the motive or purpose of the shareholder being
immaterial.0 On the other hand many courts, as in the instant case, have held
that the statutory right is subject to the implied limitation that it shall not be
used for a vexatious or improper purposeY This latter construction leaves
open the question whether the shareholder still has the burden of proving a
proper motive, as at common law, or whether the corporation now has the
burden of disproving such motive. New Jersey stands alone in holding the
statute merely declaratory of the common law; ' elsewhere the effect given
such statutes appears to have shifted the burden of proof to the corporation.
An entirely different position has been taken by some courts, which have held
that while the statute is undoubtedly absolute in its terms, it is inapplicable
when a mandamus is applied for, as the issuance of a writ of mandamus is
inherently discretionary. While the position taken by the courts which interpret the statute as giving an absolute right may in some cases result in injury
to the corporation, as where shares fall into the hands of unscrupulous competitors, nevertheless the balance of convenience favors this interpretation in
that it removes the right of the shareholder to examine the corporate records
from the realm o.f speculation and renders it definite and certain. Equity can
devise effective means for circumventing an improper use of information acquired through the exercise of this absolute privilege. It is, therefore, unfortunate that the court in the instant case reversed its former position" and
definitely took the stand that the statute does not confer an absolute right.

'Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U. S. 148, 26 Sup. Ct. 4 (9o5); Varney v.
Baker, 194 Mass. 239, 8o N. E. 524 (19o7); Phoenix Iron Co. v. Commonwealth, 113 Pa. 563, 6 Atl. 75 (1886).
I Johnson v. Langdon, 135 Cal. 624, 67 Pac. 1O5O (Io0) ; Venner v. Chicago
City R. Co., 246 Ill. 170, 92 N. E. 643 (191o); State v. Werra Aluminum
Foundry Co. ct al., 173 Wis. 651, 182 N. W. 354 (192) ; 4 FLETCHER, PRIVATIj
CompoaAnO s (1918) § 2823; 6 THomPsON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 4526.
'Foster v. White, 86 Ala- 467, 6 So. 88 (I888) ; Theile v. Cities Service Co.,
115 Atl. 773 (Md. 1922) ; See Note (1927) 6 ORE. L. REv. 285.
'State v. National Biscuit Co., 69 N. J. L. i98, 54 Atl. 241 (1902).
Uniform Busincss Corporation Act § 35, cl. 4 provides that the shareholder shall
have a right to inspect the records for a reasonable purpose only. This act has
been adopted by Idaho and Louisiana.
'Eaton v. Manter, 114 Me. 259, 95 Atl. 948 (915) ; People v. American
Press Association, 148 App. Div. 651, 133 N. Y. Supp. 216 (1912).
"°In Jameson v. Hanawalt, 67 Colo. 153, 186 Pac. 717 (1919) where the
facts were almost identical to the facts of the instant case the court used the
following language, "The demurrer to the return was properly sustained. A
stockholder's purpose in examining the books is not to be enquired into."
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clause in a life insurance policy provided that if, after payment

of the first premium and before default in any subsequent premium, insured
should give notice and proof of total disability, the insurer would pay the ensuing
premiums and also pay to the insured a stipulated monthly sum. The insured
became insane after payment of first premium and before any default, and since
neither the relatives of the insured nor the beneficiary under the policy were aware
of the existence of the policy, no notice was given until after the date for payment
of the next premium. Held, that the failure of notice is excused, and insured
may recover under the clause. Rhyne v. Jefferso, Standard Life Insvrance Co.,
154 S. E. 749 (N. C. 193o).

Insurance companies have always attempted so to draw their policies that
most of the acts required of the insured shall be conditions precedent to the
existence of liability, rather than conditions subsequent to an already accrued
liability. To achieve this end the companies maintain corps of highly skilled
attorneys who draw the policies, while the insured has no voice in the matter,
but is presented with an already prepared contract. Recognizing this fact the
courts have developed as a rule of construction that, wherever the words of a
policy are ambiguous, such ambiguity will be most strictly construed against the
insurer.' By its very wording it is evident, and it has been so held, that this
rule can have no application to situations similar to that in the principal case,
since there is nothing ambiguous to be construed, the contract clearly stating
that no liability shall accrue before notice of the disability is given to the insurer!
It is well settled that the payment of premiums is a condition precedent to any
right of the insured and will not be excused by reason of impossibility of performance.' Therefore it has been said that clauses providing for payment of
the premiums by the insurer upon notice of the disability of the insured merely
offer a further method of payment which should still be-regarded as a condition,
and that hence impossibility should be no excuse for failure to make payment
in this way.4 The majority of cases are however clearly in accord with the
principal case.5 One cause for this line of decisions is a strong disinclination on
the part of courts to allow forfeitures of policies because of some technicality
when the loss has actually been suffered! Thus a general rule has been formu'National Bank v. Ins. Co., 95 U. S. 673 (1877) ; Moulor v. American Life

Ins. Co., III U. S. 335, 4 Sup. Ct. 466 (884); VANCE, IN sRANcE (2d ed.
1930) § 257; I CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw (1929) § 188.
2 Gamble

v. Accident Assurance Co., 4 Ir. R. C. L. 2o4 (1869).
I New York Life Ins. Co. v. Alexander, x22 Miss. 813, 85 So. 93 (1920);
3 COUCH, op. cit. s=pra § 58L
4
New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 217 Ala. 307, ii6 So. 151
(1928). Contra: Levan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 138 S. C. 253, 136 S. E.
304 (927).

'Pfeiffer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 174 Ark. 783, 297 S. W. 847
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 209 Ky. 522, 273 S. W. 54
(1925) ; Marti v. Midwest Life Ins. Co., io8 Neb. 845, i8g N. W. 388 (1922);
VANcE, op. cit. supra § 85.
(1927);

'H-ayes v. Continental Casualty Co., 98 Mo. App. 410, 72 S. W. 135 (903).
But cf. Courson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 295 Pa. 518, x45 Atl. 530 (1929).
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lated to the effect that when the very loss insured against has occurred, all subsescquent acts required of the insured will be considered as conditions subsequent
and thus be excused by impossibility of performance.' In effect, the decision in
the principal case is pure judicial legislation, in contraventon of the expressed
8
intent of the parties to the contract, but it is legislation which attacks the innate
injustice of a contract which, by its technicalities, would deprive of indemnity
one who has suffered the very injury against which he believed himiself to be
insuredY

LANDLORD AND TENANT-PRIVITY OF ESTATE-LABILITY FOR RENT OF UNPRINCIPAL OF ASSlGNE--Lessees, holders of a lease wherein they
covenanted to pay taxes and rent in a specified manner, and which gave them the
right to assign or sublet, assigned the lease to G. The lessee reserved certain
rent for itself, providing for a re-entry if default should occur therein, and G
covenanted to pay the taxes and rent payable to lessor. For defaulted taxes and
rentals the lessors sued "those having the use of the property", who, it was
averred, were undisclosed principals of G. The affidavit of defense, raising
questions of law, denied liability, on the grounds that defendants were undisclosed
principals not in privity of estate with plaintiff, and that the assignee named in
the assignment could alone be proceeded against. Held (Von Moschzisker, C. J.,
and Kephart, J., dissenting), that judgment for defendants be reversed with a
procedendo, for "a question was raised which could not be disposed of on an
affidavit of defense raising the legal question suggested."' Ottnal v. NixonNirdlinger,301 Pa. 234 (1930).
The rule is well established at common law that an assignee of the leasehold
takes upon himself both the burdens and the benefits of all those covenants in the
a
lease which run with the land.' A covenant to pay rent and one to pay taxes,'
DISCLOSED

' Peele v. Provident Fund Society, 147 Ind. 543, 44 N. E. 661 (1896);
McNally v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 137 N. Y. 389, 33 N. E. 475 (1893) ; cf. Comstock
v. Fraternal Accident Ass'n, 116 Wis. 382, 93 N. W. 22 (19o3).
'Whiteside v. N. Am. Accident Ins. Co. of Chicago, 2oo N. Y. 320, 93 N.E.
948 (1911).
'See Woodmen Accident Ass'n v. Pratt, 62 Neb. 673, 87 N. W. 546 (19O1).

'Principal case, at page 243, Sadler, J., says: "We withhold our views of
the controlling principles of law, since their application will depend upon the
facts found. It must be kept in mind that judgment was here entered summarily for want of a sufficient statement. If the agency on behalf of the undisclosed principals averred in the statement is proved, then an assumption of
liability on their part may result. A mere statement of a conclusion that such
relation exists is not sufficient." The court was evidently hampered by a
scarcity of facts. The majority opinion in toto, however, seems clearly to
indicate that if the agency were in fact proved, the defendants would be liable.
'2Hannen v. Ewalt, i Pa. 9 (185) (ground rent); Negley v. Morgan,
46 Pa. 281 (1863) ; Fennell v. Guffey, 155 Pa. 38, 25 Atl. 785 (1893) ; (royalties); WOODFALL, LANDLORD & TENANT (igth ed. 1912) 3oo; I WOOD, LANDLORD & TENANT (2d ed. 1888) §§ 331, 337.
'Fennell v. Guffey, 139 Pa. 341, 2o Atl. 1O48 (1891); Fennell v. Guffey,
supra note 2; I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 56 (d).
'Com. Bldg. Asso. v. Robinson, 9o Md. 6,5, 45 At. 449 (i9oo) ; TRcIErr,
LANDLORD & TENANT (2d ed. 1929) § 371; I TIFFANY, 10C. cit. supra note 3.
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are among those covenants which so touch and concern the land that they may
be said to run therewith. This personal liability of the assignee to the lessor is
grounded in the doctrine of privity of estate, and is alien to those rules arising
from the relation of privity of contract. Therefore this liability continues only
so long as does the privity of estate." Further, although the lessee, as in the
instant case, reserves additional rent to himself, or provides for a re-entry on
breach of a condition by the assignee, the transaction is still an assignment, and
not a sublease, ceteris paribus.' Granted these elementary rules, the problem of
the principal case narrows down to this: What is the full meaning and nature
of privity of estate; and, is an undisclosed principal, whose authorized agent has
become assignee, in privity of estate with the lessor? The many Pennsylvania
cases on the subject agree in defining privity of estate as the actual or beneficial
s
This
enjoyment of the premises, or the right to possession and enjoyment
enjoyment may take the form of the assignees deriving material gain and benefit
from his position, as where he sublets the property with a profit to himself.
So, in Wickersham v. Irwin "oit was held that where the assignee, in pursuance
SBerry v. M'Mullen, 17 S. & R. 84 (Pa., 1827) ; Wickersham v. Irwin, I4
Pa. io8 (185o) ; Lowry v. Atlantic Coal Co., 272 Pa. ig, 115 Atl. 847 (1922) ;
I WOOD, LANDLOa & TENANT (2d ed. 1888) § 329; see I WASHBURN, REAL
PROPERTY (6th ed. 19o2) § 682.
6 The assignee may destroy the privity of estate by an assignment over
and a transfer of possession to a subsequent assignee, Cohen v. Todd, 130 Minn.
227, 153 N. W. 531 (1915); Goss v. Brick Co., 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 167 (1897)
(reviewing earlier Pennsylvania cases) ; Lowry v. Coal Co., supra note 5.
But where the assignee "expressly assumes" the covenants in the lease he
still continues liable to the lessor although he has effectually terminated his
privity of estate, for he is still bound, by his contractual obligation, to the
lessor, Lopizich v. Salter, 45 Cal. App. 446, 187 Pac. lO75 (192o) ; Johnston v.
§ 4574.
Messinger, 226 Ill. App. 397 (922); 5 ELLIoTT, CONTRACTS (913)
This doctrine apparently can only apply to those jurisdictions which allow a
third party beneficiary to sue upon a contract, I TIFFANY, LANDLORD & TENANT
(igo) § 158 (bb).
'Lloyd v. Cozens, 2 Ashmead 131 (Pa., i83o); 2 PRESTON, CONVEYANCING
(3d ed. 1825) 124; see Co. LinT. * 316a.
'Thorough discussions hereon are found in Negley v. Morgan, supra note 2,
and Wickersham v. Irwin, supra note 5.
Actual possession of the locus in quo by the assignee is unnecessary, Weidner v. Foster, 2 Penrose & Watts 23 (Pa., 183o) ; Hannen v. Ewalt, 18 Pa. 9
(1851) ; and the assignee is liable though he never entered the premises, Fennell
v. Guffey, supra note 2.
"When the assignee of a leasehold estate executes a lease of the premises,
reserving a larger rent or containing covenants more advantageous to the lessor
than those found in the original leasehold, he reserves to himself a benefit
derived under the original lease and his privity of estate is thus cnntlntucd,"
McClaren v. Citizens' Oil Co., i4 Pa. Super. Ct. 167, 174 (19oo).
0 14 Pa. io8 (1850). The other side o~f the situation is presented by Berry
v. M'Mullen, supra note 5, where it was held that the defendant was liable to
the lessor although he had had the legal title taken in the name of another,
since the defendant had the "equitable title" and the beneficial enjoyment of
the premises.
The assignee in the principal case is in a position not unlike that of the
donor in the Wickersham case. But under the doctrine of Johnston v. Messinger,
supra note 6, the assignee also would be liable to the lessor.
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of a parol gift, had transferred the possession of the premises to the donee, he
was not liable to the lessor on a broken covenant since he now had no beneficial
enjoyment of the property. Surely, the principal who controls with an unseen
hand the nominal assignee has the beneficial enjoyment of the premises, and any
benefit derived from the assignment is in fact his. The agent is but the human
conduit through which flow the profits to the unseen principal. The fact that
the agent holds "legal title" (i. e. the cluster of rights and liabilities that pass
with the assignment) is res illtius viontenti, mere form and shadow;" for at
most the agent holds it merely "in trust" for the principal who disburses the
This reasoning leads to the conclusion that the principal, since he
expenses.
receives the beneficial enjoyment of the property under the assignment, is in
privity of estate with the lessor, and therefore liable on the lessee's covenants
which run wit the land. This result is not at variance with the archaic rule,
that, since a sealed instrument may be enforced only against those who appear
as parties on its face, an undisclosed principal is not liable thereon." That rule
is based on the relation of privity of contract, whereas in the situation under
discussion it is privity of estate that creates the liability."' However, the result
of the principal case does conflict with the rule that an undisclosed principal is
not liable for rent where his agent takes a sealed lease in his own name." Since
the lessor and lessee are in privity of estate as well as in privity of contract,"
the arguments set down above in reference to an assignee's undisclosed principal
should apply equally well to the undisclosed principal of the lessee. Where the
instant case is accepted as law it should be regarded as abrogating the rule
which absolves the lessee's undisclosed principal from liability for rent. The
holding of the instant case is highly desirable since by application of settled
rules it fastens the burden of liability on him who justly should bear it.
"Such was the reasoning in Berry v. M'Mullen, supra note 5, and the
holding and whole spirit of that case rules the instant case. The position of
the principal in the instant case is virtually that of the defendant in the Berry
case (see note xo, supra).
'CLARK, EQUITY (1919) § 252; see Borcherling v. Katz, 37 N. J. Eq. 150,
157 (1884) ; Rothermel v. Nirdlinger, 12 Pa. D. & C. 6o6, 6og (1929); I
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 422; also vol. 2, §§ 589,
959; vol. 3, § 1049; I PERRY, TRrSTS (7th ed. 1929) §§ 127, 206.
"Mahoney v. McLean, 26 Minn. 415, 4 N. W. 784 (188o) ; I WILLIS'TON,
CONTRACTS (1920) § 296; 2 MECHEm, AGEXCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1734.
"4In the principal case Sadler, 3., penetrated to the core of the problem
when he said (page 241) : "If any liability exists it must arise from the proof
of a privity of estate rather than of contract." And again, "the unnamed
principal, in actual possession, or having the beneficial enjoyment, may be held,
and his interest may be established by evidence entirely apart from the document of title."
"Lenney v. Finley, 118 Ga. 718, 45 S. E. 593 (1903) ; Borcherling v. Katz,
supra note 15.
"i I WooD, op. cit. supra note 5, § 337; see Ghegan v. Young, 23 Pa. 18, 20
(1854). It is because of his privity of contract that the lessee still continues
liable for rent which assignee fails to pay, and this even though the lessor has
meanwhile been receiving due rent from the assignee, Schehr v. Berkey. 166
Cal. 157, 135 Pac. 41 (1913) ; MacFarland v. Mayo, 65 Okla. 28. 162 Pac. 753

(1916) ; Ghegan v. Young, supra; 2
§ 65o.

UNDERHILL, LANDLORD

& TENANT

(1909)
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MANDAMUS-RGHT

TO

COMPEL

COURT TO APPROVE

DEPUTY APPOINTED

PURSUANT TO AN ILLEGAL CONTRACT-A statute' provided that the sheriff had
the right to appoint deputies by and with the approval of the county court.
Plaintiff, a candidate for the office of sheriff, agreed that if elected he would
allow X the privilege of selecting ten deputies, in consideration of X's political

support. Plaintiff was elected, and, pursuant to the agreement, submitted the
name of Y to the defendant, judge of the county court, for approval. Y was
ignorant of plaintiff's agreement with X. Defendant learned of the agreement, and refused to approve Y's appointment solely for that reason. Plaintiff then petitioned for a writ of mandamus. Held (3 judges dissenting), that
the writ should issue, since the defendant, in approving an appointee, may
not look beyond the proposed candidate's personal qualifications for the office.
Fox v. Petty, 3o S. W. (2d) 945 (Ky., 193o).
While the writ of mandamus will not issue to review an exercise of discretion,' it may be used to compel an inferior tribunal to exercise its discretion, although the particular manner in which such discretion shall be exercised
will not be controlled. However, the writ properly issues when the discretion
has been exercised on some ground not legally tenable.' It is conceded that
the requirement of approval by the county court in the instant case, vests in
that body a discretionary power.' The real difficulty arises in the application
of the yardstick to this power. The majority opinion limits the scope of the
power to a consideration of the personal qualifications of the appointee; and
it decides that the fact that the appointee was selected in an illegal manner
does not ipso facto make him any the less qualified.6 If the purpose of the
statute was to vest in the defendant a discretionary power of approval, so
that only well-qualified deputies would be appointed," it is very difficult to
comprehend how the decision in the instant case furthers that purpose. On
principle, a strong argument might be made to the effect that a deputy so
selected would be as undesirable in office as a deputy whose personal qualifications were objectionable. Added to the fact that the courts should not back'KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1922) § 456o.
'Wilbur v. U. S., 281 U. S. 206, 5o Sup. Ct. 32o (193o) ; Crocker v. Justices of Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 94 N. E. 369 (1911).
'State ex rel. Clarke v. West, 272 Mo. 304, 198 S. W. 1111 (1917);
People ex rel. Desiderio v. Connolly, 238 N. Y. 326, 144 N. E. 629 (1924) ;
Reese v. Pollard, 248 Pa. 617, 94 At]. 246 (1915). The writ will not issue
unless the legal right to it is clearly established, Quernheim v. Asselmeier, 296
IIl. 494, 129 N. E. 828 (1921); HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES (3d
ed. 1896) § 9.
'See cases cited supra note 3.
'The court is in accord on this point, Day v. Justices of the County Court,
3 B. Mon. 198 (Ky., 1842) ; Dassey v. Sanders, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 972, 33 S. W.

193 (1895). In State ex rel. Reid v. Distric4 Judge, 41 La. Ann. 73, 74, 5 So.
648 (1889), the court says: "The sanction of the judge is required by law. He
is vested with a legal discretion in such matter, and, after he has exercised it,
he cannot be required to undo what he has undone, and act to the very reverse."
Principal case, at 946, 947.
See Applegate v. Applegate, 4 Mete. 236, 237 (Ky., 1863).
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handedly enforce such an agreement O as was entered into in the instant case,
there is the fundamentally sound legal basis upon which the writ of mandamus
may be refused. The discretion of the defendant is not limited by the statute;
he has exercised it in a manner consistent with the purposes of the statute;
therefore, mandamus will not issue to review his exercise of that power. The
ends to be attained by agreements of this sort are too often reached without
the agreement itself becoming judicially known to the court; hence, it would
seem wise, when such agreements are disclosed, to adopt the suggestion of the
dissenting opinion, that "the courts should decree the taking of no step necessary to the execution of such agreements."'

MORTGAGES-STATUS OF PRIOR DEBT UNDER MORTGAGE CLAUSE SECURING

ALL INDEBTEDNESS-Defendant husband executed a note. Thereafter he joined
with his wife, the other defendant, in executing a second note secured by a
joint mortgage which further secured "any claims that may come into the
hands of the said mortgagee, or his assigns, by purchase or otherwise, against
said mortgagors or either of them." Plaintiff procured both notes and the
mortgage by assignment and seeks to foreclose the mortgage on the first note.
Held (four judges dissenting), that plaintiff is not entitled to foreclose, on the
ground that public policy does not permit the subjection of the wife's interest
in the property to a liability not intended by her. SuIlivan v. Murphy et al.,
232 N. W. 267 (Iowa, ig3o).
Although the decision in the instant case rests upon peculiar facts,' the
case suggests the problem of what effect the courts will give to a mortgage
clause purporting to secure all claims when the indebtedness in controversy
was contracted prior to the execution of the mortgage. It is well settled that
mortgages to secure future advances are valid.' A definite statement of the
amount secured is not necessary,3 nor is the amount of consideration expressed
material. 4 It has also been held that a mortgage to secure future advances
'The authorities are unanimous in holding such agreements void, as being
contrary to public policy. For cases so holding, see Meguire v. Corwine, l1
U. S. io8 (188o) ; Glass v. Harwell, 40 Ga. App. 400, 149 S. E. 722 (1929).
" See dissenting opinion in principal case, at 949.
'The facts showed that defendant mortgagors had no intention in giving
mortgage to secure payment of first note, but the intention of defendant wife
that the mortgage should be security only for the second note not having been
expressed or shown to the mortgagee, such intention or mistake in signing the
mortgage could not have been shown in evidence, 5 WIGAtORE, EVIDENCE (1923)
§§ 2414 (a), 2415 (a). It is effective in the instant case only because the facts
were taken from unobjected stipulations having the effect of testimony in the
record.
"Note (1913) 62 U. OF PA. L. REv. 556; see infra notes 3 and 4.
'Shirras & others v. Caig, II U. S. 34 (1812); Stoughton v. Pasco, 5
Conn. 442 (1825).
*Anglo-Californian Bank v. Cerf, 147 Cal. 384, 81 Pac. 1077 (1905);
Miller v. Lockwood, 32 N. Y. 247 (1865).
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may be extended to cover prior indebtedness by agreement of the parties,5 and
that a mortgage executed after the date of a note will become a part qf the
contract if such appears from all the circumstances to be the intention of the
parties.0 It would logically follow, applying the principle that a mortgage
given to secure an unascertained debt is sufficient if it contain such facts as
will lead an interested party to ascertain the real state of the mortgage by
inquiry of the parties to it,' that a mortgage to secure all indebtedness should
be so enforced. Moreover, since the courts do not explicitly deny this conclusion and since they hold that such a clause will cause the mortgage to be a
security for future indebtedness,' it might reasonably be expected that a prior
indebtedness would be included within the effect of the mortgage clause. Most
of the few cases on point, however, reach an opposite result when a prior debt
is at issue, holding that such words do not express the intention of the parties '
or that the indebtedness must arise from dealings directly between the mortgagor and mortgagee. ' It would seem, therefore, that while the enforcement
of such a condition might be upheld," the court should be satisfied that the
intention, as expressed by the mortgage terms and attendant circumstances,"
is clearly to secure any previously contracted claims.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-COLLATERAL ATrACK ON RECORDS OF CIYv
COUxIC-EFFECT ON MUnICIPAL BoNDs-The holder of municipal improve-

ment bonds sought to enforce a lien attached to defendant's property, alleged
to have arisen by virtue of an assessment of the City Council. The property
owner defended on the ground that the proceedings of the council -were void
because of the absence of a quorum when the assessment was levied, and
prayed by cross-bill that he be granted a decree cancelling the same as a cloud
on his title. The records of the City Council showed a quorum to have been
present. Held (one justice dissenting), that records such as these, required to
be kept by law, are conclusive upon all the world as long as they stand as
records, and can only be impeached in a proceeding instituted directly for that
purpose. Penton v. Brou'n-Crummer Investment Co., 130 So. (Ala., i93o).
Farabee v. McKerrihan, 172 Pa. 234, 33 Atl. 583 (1896).

Spesard v. Spesard, 75 Kans. 87, 88 Pac. 576 (I9O7).
71 JoNES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 426.
8
Corn Belt Say. Bank v. Kriz, 207 Iowa ii, 219 N. W. 503 (1928); Exchange Trust Co. v. Hitchcock, 249 Mass. 547, 144 N. E. 373 (1924) ; Wall v.
Boisgerard, 19 Miss. 574 (848).
' Lashbrooks v. Hatheway, 52 Mich. 124, 17 N. W. 723 (1883) ; Belton v.
Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, i86 N. C. 614, 120 S. E. 220 (I923) ; cf. Fleming
v. Georgia R. R. Bank, 12o Ga. 1023, 48 S. E. 42o (i9o4) ; Upton v. Bank, 120
Mass. 153 (1876).
'o Lashbrooks v. Hatheway, supra note 9. But cf. First National Bank v.
Byard, 26 N. J. Eq. 255 (1875).
I See Lamoille County Say. Bank v. Belden, 90 Vt. 535, 539, 98 Atl. 1002,

1004 (i916).
"Parol evidence is competent to apply a written contract to its proper
subject matter, Jones v. Guaranty & Ind. Co., 1oI U. S. 622 (1879) ; Moses v.

Hatfield,

27

S. C. 324, 3 S. E. 538 (1887)

; I JONES, MORTGAGES

§ 434.
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It has long been settled that the decree of a court is not subject to a
collateral attack,' at least where its records are valid on their face and show
a proper exercise of jurisdiction.' This rule has by analogy been applied to
the records of municipal corporations; and it is quite generally held as in the
instant case that such records, too, may only be attacked in a proceeding instituted directly for that purpose,' mandamus being the accepted method of
accomplishing this.4 In most of the cases decided prior to the principal case
and asserting this rule that municipal records cannot be collaterally attacked,
the object of the attack was to explain, enlarge, or contradict some portion of
the record.3 There might well be a difference in a case like the instant one
where the object is not to vary or alter the records, but to attack their very
existence' on the basis of the accepted doctrine that acts done by a municipal
corporation in the absence of a quorum are totally void But we find, with one
possible exception,' that the few decisions and text writers considering this
problem have not indicated that any such distinction should be drawn.' There
'A collateral attack may be defined as any attempt to impeach a decree or
a judgment or a public record in a proceeding which has not been instituted
for that express purpose, People v. McDonald, 264 Ill. 514, 517, io6 N. E. 5oi,

503 (94); Morrill v. Morrill, 20 Ore. 96, 1OI, 25 Pac. 362, 365 (89o)
BAILENTINE, LAw DICTIONARY (1930) 230.

'McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall. 23 (U. S. 1869); Miller v. Thompson, 209
Ala. 469, 96 So. 481 (923) ; I1n re Gottesfeld, 245 Pa. 314, 9i Atl. 494 (1914) ;
I BLACK, JUDGMENTS (1902) § 245 et seq., VAN FLEET, COLLATERAL ATTACK
ON JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS (1892) 29.
3Shank v. Ravenswood, 43 W. Va. 242, 27 S. E. 220 (1897) ; Bartlett v.
Eau Claire County, 112 Wis. 237, 88 N. W. 61 (igoi) ; 2 DILON, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS (5th ed., 1911) § 556; 2 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
(2d ed., 1928) § 651.

' Samis v. King, 40 Conn. 298 (1873) ; Gaither v. Green, 40 La. Ann. 362,

365, 4 So. 210, 212 (1888) ; 2 MCQUILLAN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 658; see 2

DILLON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 553, in connection with dissenting opinion of
Church, C. J., in Boston Turnpike Co. v. Pomfret, 20 Conn. 59o, 6o2 (850).
1 Cases supra note 3; also Mathis v. Runnel Co., 66 Fed. 494 (C. C. A. 5th,
1894) (variance in date); State v. Simmons, 4o La. 758, 5 So. 29 (1888)
(variance in vote) ; Mayhew v. Gay Head, 13 Allen 129 (Mass., 1866) (variance
in vote).

6 By analogy to the familiar parol evidence rule, 5 WIG,1oRE, EviDENCE
(2d ed. 1923) § 2400 et seq.
' State v. Porter, 113 Ind. 79, 14 N. E. 883 (1887); Commonwealth v.
Garvey, 217 Pa. 425, 66 Atl. 652 (19o7) : Wescott v. Scull, 87 N. J. L. 410, 96
At. 407 ( 915) ; 2 DILLON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 541.

'City of Benwood v. Wheeling R. R. Co., 53 W. Va. 465, 476, 44 S. E.
"The attendance of a quorum is a condition precedent to
everything. Until then there is an absolute incapacity to act in any way on
271, 275 (1903),

any matter . . . Until it comes into existence it cannot proceed nor make
any record of its proceedings . . . Their action being absolutely void may

be ignored or attacked in any proceeding."
I Shank v. Ravenswood, supra note 3; 2 MCQUILLAN, 1oc. cit. supra note 3.
Quoting from the latter, "Records imperatively required by law, made by the
proper officers, are conclusive of the facts stated therein, not only upon the
corporation but upon all the world as long as they stand as records. Their
accuracy can only be contradicted or impeached in proceedings instituted
directly for that purpose."
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is, and it seems should be, a strong presumption in favor of the regularity of
public records kept in due form,"0 and thus to prohibit, in a purely collateral
attack, an inquiry into the constitution of a council meeting where the record
shows the meeting to have been properly constituted certainly seems to be
based on a salutary principle. The obvious effect of this decision on the defendant will be to force him to take an additional and possibly troublesome
step" in order that he may defend the bondholder's suit; but, assuming that he
will so act, what will be the result as to the plaintiff bondholder? The existence of his lien is based entirely upon the validity of the assessment of the
council," yet he will not be either a necessary or proper party to the proceedings by which such assessment is attacked. 3 The dissenting opinion in the
principal case" felt that this left the plaintiff without relief, but while it is
true that he would thus be deprived of his action against the land owner, he
In view of
would still be able to enforce his bonds against the municipality.'
these considerations it seems that the court might properly have acted upon
the defendant's petition, within its equitable powers, to prevent a multiplicity
of suits " and to remove the cloud from his title." On the other hand, the
decision can scarcely be criticized for following the satisfactory legal rules
applicable, under which the rights of all-City Council, landowner, and bondholder-are adequately protected.

NEGLIGENCE-UNINTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION AS A BASIS FOR LAnIL-

InY WITHOUT PRIVITY OF CONTRACT-An indenture of trust, executed by a cor-

poration, recited the corporation's intention to issue bonds secured by specified
collateral, which bonds should be authenticated by the defendant as trustee. The
defendant failed to ascertain whether the collateral deposited corresponded to
that required in the trust agreement, authenticating the bonds on securities of a
different nature which proved worthless, to the injury of the plaintiff and other
purchasers of the bonds. Held, that the defendant was liable for its negligent
" Pilcher v. City of Dothan, 2o7 Ala. 421, 93 So. I6 (1922) ; 2 MCQUILLAN,
op. cit. supra note 3, § 647. The clerk of the City Council in the instant case
was under a statutory duty to keep the records in question, ALA. POL. CODE
(1923) § 1915.

'This method is to petition the council to alter their records to conform
to the truth; or, failing that, to bring mandamus against the City Clerk. On
right of council to alter records, see Note (I919) 3 A. L. R. 1308; on
mandamus, see citations supra note 4.
' ". . . Council shall proceed by order or resolution to fix the amount of
assessment against each lot," ALA. POL. CODE (1923) § 2199. "The Council

of such city or town may transfer or assign such to contractor . . . or any
\
other person," ALA. POL. CODE (1923) § 2200.
'"Petition or mandamus brought by landowner.
"Brown, J., principal case at -.

'Hellman v. Shoulters, 114 Cal. 136, 44 Pac. 915 (1896) ; 2 MCQUILLAX,
op. cit. supra note 3, § 655; 2 DILLOX, op. cit. supra note 3, § 541, § 893.
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 260.
§ 9905; 4 DILLON, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1590,
"ALA. CIV. CODE (1923)
I HIGH, INJUNCTIONS (4th ed. 19o5) § 372.

RECENT CASES
misrepresentations. Doyle v. Chatham & Phenix Nat. Bank, 253 N. Y. 369,
I71 N. E. 574 (930).
The defendants, accountants engaged by a corporation to audit its books,
prepared and certified a balance sheet reporting a net worth of over a million
dollars at a time when the corporation was in fact insolvent. In reliance upon
this report, the plaintiff accepted the corporation's application for a loan, advancing sums of money which were not repaid. Held, that the defendants were
liable for their negligence in misrepresenting the financial condition of the corporation. UltramaresCorporation v. Touche et al., 243 N. Y. Supp. 179 (App.
Div. 193o).
The doctrine that a misrepresentation of an existing fact may constitute
negligent conduct and be actionable as such' does not appear to be meeting with
approval. Recent decisions-in jurisdictions other than New York and New
Hampshire-are in accord with the overwhelming weight of authority that contractual privity between plaintiff and defendant is prerequisite to the existence of
a duty upon the defendant to give information with reasonable care.2 Many
courts, realizing the desirability of a cause of action against the negligent informer, are willing to find this privity by regarding the plaintiff the third-party
beneficiary of a contract between the defendant and another,' or by considering
that other an agent of the plaintiff in consummating the dontract with the
defendant;' liability has also been based upon the "public calling" of the defendant.' The reluctance of most courts to place redress for unintentional misreprepresentation upon its true basis' may be attributed to the fear that liability
will be carried too far:' Therefore, it is desirable that the elements constituting
the cause of action for negligent misrepresentation be set forth explicitly-with
a view, on the one hand, to allay the traditional fears of extended liability ;8 on
the other, to allow for future development, in that "life has relations not capable
always of division into inflexible compartments"% The Ultramares decision is
based upon elements, previously set forth by Justice Andrews,' which may be
analyzed as follows: (i) there must be knowledge, or its equivalent, (a) that
14 TORTS RESTATEME.NTI (Am. L. Inst. 1929) § 186; Edwards v. Lamb, 69
N. H. 599, 45 At. 48o (1899) ; Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E.
275 (922).

'New England Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Brock, 169 N. E. 803 (Mass.
i93o) ; Peterson v. Gales, I91 Wis. 137, 21o N. W. 407 (1926) ; National Iron &
Steel Co. v. Hunt, 312 Ill. 245, 143 N. E. 833 (1924).
'Shine v. Nash, 217 Ala. 498, 117 So. 47 (1928).
"Murphy v. Fidelity Abstract & Title Co., 114 Wash. 77, 194 Pac. 591
(1920).

'6 See Glanzer v. Shepard, supra note I, and citations therein.
That the true basis of liability is negligent conduct, see Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty (1929) 4z HARV. L. R.V. 733,
which states that "great confusion has resulted, and improper analogies have
been followed". Cf. Green, Deceit (1930) 16 W. VA. L. REv. 749.
"The smallness of the compensation paid to the defendants for the services
requested is in striking contrast to the enormity of the liability now sought to be
imposed upon them", Finch, J., dissenting in the Ultramares case, at 186.
Accord: Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 1O7 At. 783 (0919).
'Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903).
-'Cardozo, J., in Glanzer v. Shepard, supra note i, at 241, 135 N. E. at 277.
"International Products Co. v. Erie R. R., 244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 66o
(1927)
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the information is desired for a serious purpose, (b) that he to whom it is given
intends to rely and act upon it, (c) that, if it be false or erroneous, he will
because of it be injured in person or property; (2) the relationship of the parties, arising Gut of contract or otherwise, must be such that in morals and good

conscience (a) the one has the right to rely upon the other for information, and
(b) the other giving the information owes a duty to give it with care. However, in the Doyle case Justice Kellogg purports to restate certain of these elements, in a manner which suggests a comparison when set forth as follows:
(i) There must be knowledge (a) that the informative statement is desired for
a serious purpose, (b) that those for whom it is made intend to rely and act
upon it, (c) that, if it be false, they may be injured! 1 It is to be observed that
this is hardly a restatement, actually differing from Justice Andrews' requisites
in the following respects: In (i), the "equivalent" of knowledge is not specified
as sufficient; in (b), protection is allowed "those for whom it [the statement] is
made", not merely "he to whom it is given"; in (c), the obvious point is knowledge that injury may result, not that it will result. Of these differences, the
first appears to be a limitation of liability; the second and third, extensions.
However, it is to be noted that Justice Kellogg is not formulating any new
principles, but is correctly stating the present basis of liability for negligent
misrepresentation in the state of New York: Actual knowledge of the prospective use of the information has existed in the cases which have allowed recov-

ery ;' that the information need not be given by the defendant to the plaintiff
has also been recognized ;" and it is manifest that the law of torts is concerned
more with the probability than with the certainty of injury. The Doyle case is
to be welcomed for its clarification of the subject at this time ;'4 that the elements are set forth in broad terms is more a virtue than a fault.'
As modern
civilization grows more complex, reliance upon the accuracy of informative
statements plays an increasingly necessary role. Therefore, it is to be hoped
that this opinion will encourage courts to desert "the ancient citadel of privity"."
"Rule (2) as stated by Justice Andrews was restated verbatim by Justice
Kellogg, and need not here be repeated.
' See Glanzer v. Shepard, supra note i ; International Products Co. v. Erie
R. R., supra note io. In New Hampshire it has been held sufficient that the
defendant should have known that the plaintiff would rcly, Conway Nat. Bank v.
Pease, 76 N. H. 319, 82 Ati. io68 (1912) ; but see Maxwell Ice Co. v. Brackett,
Shaw & Lunt Co., 8o N. H. 236, 116 Atl. 34 (1921). Of course, in both New
York and New Hampshire that the defendant should have known the falsity of
the information has been held sufficient.
" Glanzer v. Shepard, supra note i.
" The narrowness of the requisites set forth by Justice Andrews not only
influenced the minority of the court in the Ultramares case, but had previously
affected the holding in Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking
Corp., 245 N. Y. 377, 157 N. E. 272 (1927).
"For instance, rule (2) recognizes that the following circumstances may
arise in the particular case before the court: the services of the defendant may
have been rendered gratuitously; the plaintiff may have been contributorily negligent; the doctrine of caveat emptor may be applicable; the nature of tlhe services rendered may also affect the case. Consideration of these problems is outside
the scope of this comment. See Bohlen, Misrepresentationas Deceit, Negliqence,
or Warranty, supra note 6; Jaillet v. Cashman, 235 N. Y. 511, 139 N. E. 714
(1923) ; Benoit v. Perkins, 7o N. H. 11, 104 Atl. 254 (i918).
"'CARDOZ0, TrE GROWTH OF TER LAW (1927) 77.
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PRACTIcE-PENNsYLVANiA PIEADING-NEcEssrrY FOR PARTICULARITY IN
EVALUATING SEPARATE ITEMs OF DAMAGE IN ACTiONS OF TRESPASS-In an
action of trespass for wrongfully emptying refuse into a stream, the plaintiff
sought damages for injury to his stream, dam, to the operation of his mill, to
the harvesting of ice, and for depreciation in value of farming land. For these
injuries a lump sum of $5,000 was demanded. On the basis that the damages
should have been itemized, the defendant entered a rule for a more specific statement of claim. Held, that the statement of claim must be amended to particularize the damages. Rumble v. Locust Mountain Coal Co., 13 D. & C. 476 (Pa.
193o) (Schuylkill County).
With its inception in an agreement of attorneys of the Philadelphia Bar in
1795 and the Statement of Claim Act of 18o6, the movement in Pennsylvania to
eradicate the legalistic technicalities of common law pleading and to introduce
a procedure whereby issues would be definitely and concisely formulated, has
been of persistent growth.' Though definiteness of allegation in the statement
of the plaintiff's claim has been among the requisites of proper pleading under
the acts of 18o6,2 1887,1 and 1915,' there has been a notable confusion among the
cases as to the necessary particularity of damages in actions of trespass. However, an examination of these cases reveals that, although the results of some
cases are irreconcilable, there is a tendency toward uniformity of result on similar fact situations. When the damages have been reduced to a certainty prior
to suit, they must accordingly be itemized.' Likewise, when, though not reduced
to a certainty before the institution of the suit, they are reasonably susceptible
of particularization, the statement of claim will be bad on rule for a more
specific statement or on motion to strike off.6 On the other hand, when the
I AMRAM, PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE (1930) 42 et seq. For a risum o f
the original courts and practice in Pennsylvania see generally LOYD, EARLY
COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA (1910).

- I8o6, 4 Sm. L. 326, § 5, PA. STAT. (West, 1920) § 17205.
1i887 P. L. 271, PA. STAT. (West, 192o) §§ 17177 et seq.
'1915 P. L. 483, PA. STAT. (West, x92o) §§ 17181 et seq.
'Collins v. Heibel, 2 Erie z49 (Pa. 192o) ; Bittner v. York, 34 York 173
(Pa. 1921) ; Bollinger v. Greenaway, 3 D. & C. 312 (Pa. 1922) (York); Diehl
v. Stewartstown R. R., 6 D. & C. 269 (Pa. 1924) (York); Csapo v. Du Bois,
20 Northptn. I (Pa. 1925); Folz v. Zimmerman, io D. & C. 433 (Pa. 1927)
(Phila. C. P. 5 ) (holding that lost emoluments must be itemized) ; Moser v.
Fernsler, 23 Schuyl. 95 (Pa. 1927); see Hawes v. O'Reilly, 126 Pa. 44o, 17 At].
642 (i889); Hyde Park Gas Co. v. People's Coal Co., 29 D. R. 841 (Pa.
i919) (Lackawanna); Snyderman v. Burns, 16 Del. 3o9 (Pa. 1923); Long v.
McAllister, 275 Pa. 34, ii8 Ati. 5o6 (1922) (values in action of deceit are necessary). Contra: Ellsworth v. O'Keefe, 26 D. R. 277 (Pa. 1917) (Phila. C. P.
5) ; Coup v. Fairchild, 29 D. R. 640 (Pa. 1917) (Northumberland); McDonald
v. Spence, 4 Wash. 68 (Pa. 1924); Leibfried v. Wissler, 40 Lanc. 177 (Pa.
1926) ; see Delaney v. Chester, 26 D. R. 6z (Pa. 1916) ; Elliott v. Shipman, io
Leh. 6 334, 335 (Pa. 1923).
Philadelphia Battery Co. v. Air Reduction Co., 274 Fed. 216 (E. D. Pa.
1921) ; Dietz v. Chemical Co., 29 D. R. 691 (Pa. 1920) (York); Waldbiesser v.
Travaglini, ig Northptn. 31 (Pa. 1923); Milakofsky v. Raff Co., 9 D. & C. 524
(Pa. 1927) (Phila. C. P. 5) ; Helenthal v. Geller, 13 D. & C. 329 (Pa. 1929)
(Lancaster) ; see Atherton v. Clearview Coal Co., 267 Pa. 425, 1no At. 296
(ig2o) ; Grumley v. Pellegrino, 4 D. & C. 2o5 (Pa. 1923) (Elk). Contra: Erb
v. Ely, 39 Lanc. 216 (Pa. 1924).
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damages are entirely unliquidated and can with no justifiable definiteness be
itemized, lumping of damages is usually permitted.' Tests of this nature, of
necessity, place much discretion in the court, but this is not an undesirable result.
In holding a statement bad for lack of particularity, the courts generally have
merely cited Section 5 of the Act of 1915 ' which, without differentiating between
actions of assumpsit and actions of trespass, requires a concise statement of all
material facts. Conversely, in upholding the view that such particularity is not
required, courts have held that this section is partially superseded by Section 13,'
which provides that in actions of trespass the defendant need not in his pleadings
answer averments of damagc2' When it is recalled, however, that one of the
basic purposes of definiteness in pleading is to enable the other party intelligently
to prepare for trial,' it would appear that too much stress should not be placed
upon this interpretation of Section 13 and that the plaintiff should be held, in
conformity with the above formula as developed by the majority of Pennsylvania
courts, and as seen in the present case, to that degree of particularity to which
the facts of the case are reasonably susceptible."

TORTs-DUTY OF OCCUPIER OF LAND TO WARN BUSINESS GUEST OF DANGER
FROM CRIMINAL ACT COiMMITTED ON THE PREMISEs-Defendant bank's floor-

walker directed plaintiff customer to a nearby window, although the former
knew that a man standing a few feet away had threatened to blow up the bank
if his request for money was refused. When bank police approached to apprehend the bomber, he discharged the bomb, wrecking the bank and injuring the
customer. Held, that the bank owed a duty to the customer, as an invitee, to
warn him of the danger. Sbum v. Farmers'Deposit Sa. Bank, 30o Pa. 85, I5
Ad. 163 (930).
Generally speaking, early law recognized no affirmative duty to act ior
another's protection,' but it is now settled that an occupier of real estate is under
an obligation to those who enter upon his premises, for purposes in which he has
a business interest, to use reasonable care to prepare a safe place for them, or
'Rogers v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 22 D. R. 41 (Pa. 1912) (Phila. C. P.
5) ; Delaney v. Chester; Collins v. Heibel, both mspra note 5; McCaffrey v.
Montgomery, i5 Del. 588 (Pa. ig2i) (Washington); Griffith v Smith, i D. &
C. 628 (Pa. igzi) (Bucks) ; McDonald v. Spence, szpra note 5.
8 1915 P. L. 483, § 5, PA. STAT. (West, 192o) § 17185.
8 1915 P. L. 483, § 13, PA. STAT. (West, i92O) § 17193.
" Cases cited stipranote 7.
'See Bollinger v. Greenaway, supra note 5 at 312 and 314; Diehl v. Stewartstown R. R., supra note 5 at 270; Moser v. Fernsler, supra note 5 at 97;

Dietz v. Chemical Co., supra note 6 at 693.
'The problem here considered is distinct from that of averring special as
distinguished from general damages. See Trevena v. Zimmerman, 3o D. R.
io72 (Pa. 1921) ; 3 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) § 1165a; 4 ibid. 1261.
'Bohlen, Afflrinctive Obligations in the Law of Tort (i9o5) 53 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 209, 214; cf. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF ToaTs, TENTATIVE DRAFT
No. 4 (Am. L. Inst. 1929) §§ 192-193.
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to make appearances conform to reality by warning of non-apparent dangers.
The historical development of these affirmative obligations in torts from the
contract action of assumpsit t indicates that this duty is based on a consideration
or benefit to the occupier derived from his business interest in the invitee's
presence,' though some authorities state, as does the court in the prircipal case,
that the duty depends solely upon a tacit invitation,' thus confusing the reason
for the privilege to enter with the basis for the duty of protection. Admitting
that ordinarily' an occupier's duty of protection is discharged by warning his
business guest of undisclosed dangers of which such occupier knows or should
know, it is argued that there is no duty to protect an invitee from a criminal
force that does not arise from a purpose incidental to the occupation of the
premises. The argument is based on the holding by many courts that the participation of a criminal actor constitutes an "intervening cause",7 but liability has
generally been upheld where foreseeability of the type of criminal act committed
is necessary to satisfy the duty.' One recent case has gone so far as to hold

:-'It
is often stated that the customer is "entitled to the exercise of leasonable
care by the occupier to prevent damage from unusual danger, of which the occupier knows or ought to know," Indermaur v. Dames, L. R. I C. P. 274 (I866);
&ff'd L. R. 2 C. P. 311 (1867) (leading case) ; Bennett v. Railroad Co., 102
U. S. 577 (i88o); Pauckner v. Wakem, 231 Ill. 276, 83 N. E. 202 (i9o7) ;
Carleton v. Franconia Co., 99 Mass. 216 (1868) ; Bloomer v. Snellenburg, 221
Pa. 25, 69 Ati. I124 (igo8) ; RESTATEMENT, op. cit. sutprar note I, § 213.
'Bohlen, op. cit. supra note I.
'Bennett v. Railroad Co., at 585; Pauckner v. Wakemn, at 279, 83 N. E.
at 204; Carleton v. Franconia Co., at 219; Indermaur v. Dames, at 286, all suprty
note 2; Kapuscianski v. Phila. & R. Co., 289 Pa. 388, 391, 137 Atl. 61g, 620
(1927) ; Goodrich, Landowner's Duty to Strangers on. His Premises-=
s Developed in the Iowa Decisions (1921) 7 IowA L. BUL.. 76, 87; see (1929) 27 Mica.
L. REV. 718; RESTATEMENT, loc. cit. sutpra note 2 (Comment a).
'Upp v. Darner, I5O Iowa 403, 407, 13o N. W. 409, 410 (I9II) ; Robb v.
Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 269 Pa. 298, 300, 112 At]. 459, 46o (i92I) ; 2 COOLEY,
TORTS (3d. ed. 19o6) 1259; WHARTON, NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 1878) §351. But
see Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 4, at 65, 8o.
' More substantial protective measures have been required of occupiers
whose business interests usually require large groups of the public to gather
upon the premises: Nordgren v. Strong, 149 Atl. 2o1 (Conn. 1930) (bathing
resort) ; Dickson v. Waldron, 135 Ind. 507, 34 N. E. 5o6 (I893) (theatre);
Curran v. Olson, 88 Minn. 307, 92 N. W. 1124 (9o3)
(inn); Pittsburg, F. W.
& Chicago Ry. Co. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. 512 (1866) (common carrier); RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note I, § 218; I FrTER, CARRIERS (1897) §96.
'The Lusitania, 251 Fed. 715 (S. D. N. Y. 1918); Andrews v. Kinsell, 114
Ga. 390, 40 S. E. 300 (i19O); Hullinger v. Worrell, 83 Ill.
220 (1876). But see
RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note I, § 194.
.Payne v. Moore, 196 Ky. 454, 244 S. W.

869 (1922); Jones v. State, 122

Me. 214, 119 Atl. 577 (1923) ; Garceau v. Engel, 169 Minn. 62, 21o N. W. 608
(1926) ; Brower v. N. Y. Central Ry. Co., 9I N. J. L. 190, IO3 Ati. I66 (I918)
(as in the principal case, it was held that the defendant's negligent act and the
criminal act were concurrent causes) ; Hines v. Garrett, 131 Va. 125, io8 S. E.
690 (1921) ; Marshall v. Caledonian Ry. Co., I Sess..Cas. 5th Sec., io6o (I899) ;
RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 1, § 184 (b) (Comment n). But see Nirdlinger v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 245 Pa. 453, 9I Ati. 883 (1914).
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that the conductor on a common carrier was legally obligated not to flee when
the opportunity presented itself but to stand his ground and aid a passenger who
was grappling with an armed highwayman.' Such an extreme duty may be
sustained on the principle that a member of the public has a right to the services
of a public utility and the fact that the customer knows of the danger does not
obviate further protective measures, since, in the case of a public utility, it could
not be held that the customer, in order to protect himself, must forego use of
the utility.' But in situations like that in the principal case, where a private
occupier of land is involved, disclosure of the danger is all that the business
guest can demand. Having entered under a mere privilege that arises solely out
of the occupier's consent, he cannot object that a mere warning of undisclosed
danger is insufficient because it requires him to leave the premises to avoid the
danger. However,' even though the presence of the criminal actor may not
have been anticipated in the instant case, the bak's knowledge of the hidden
danger gave rise to an absolute duty to warn; such a duty cannot justly be tolled
by any peculiarity in the source of the danger.

OF LAND TO HABITUALLY TRESPASSsued for injuries incurred in rescuing his son, aged

TORTS-DUTY OWED BY THE POSSESSOR

ING CHILDREN-Plaintiff

five, from a runaway freight car which had been started down defendant's inclined siding by the slight jar given it when the boy climbed upon it. Plaintiff's
evidence tended to prove that for thirty years children had played on cars standing on this unfenced siding without objection by defendant, and that the accident
resulted frbm a failure to secure the car by other means than air brakes (which
ordinarily hold for a short time only) when it was placed on the siding several
hours earlier. Held, that he defendant's motion for a directed verdict was
properly denied. Christiansenv. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. R. Co., 291 Pac.
926 (Utah 193o).
'Terre

" See

Haute, Ind. & Eastern T. Co. v. Scott, 17o N. E. 341 (Ind. 193o).
10C. cit. supra note 8 (Comment a).

RESTATEMENT,

'Ibid.; cf. Fleishmann Malting Co. v. Mrkacek, 14 Fed. (2d) 602 (C. C. A.
7th, 1926) (warning of general dangers not sufficient).
'The

"danger invites rescue" doctrine was conceded to be applicable under

the facts of the instant case if negligence of defendant caused the boy's peril.
' Leading articles on the problem of a landowner's duty to trespassing

children are: Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His
Premises of Their Own Right (1921) 69 U. OF PA. L. REv. 142, 237, 340,
BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 156; Goodrich, Landowner's
Duty to Strangers on His Premises (1922), 7 IOWA L. BULL 65; Hudson,
T.7 Tur:dable Cases in the Federal Courts (1923), 36 HAzav. L. REV. 826;
Jeremiah Smith, Liability of Landourners to Children Entering without Permission (1898) i1 HARv. L. REv. 349, 434.
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Courts have held that the possessor of land owes a duty of care to a trespassing child in three situations:' (I) where he knows the child is present,'
(2)
where children have habitually been present within a limited area with at
least his passive toleration,' (3) where he has created a condition on his premises
attractive especially to children and tempting them into a danger which their
immaturity prevents them from discovering-the oft-termed "attractive nuisance" doctrine. The instant decision seems correct in holding that the unopposed intrusion of children was sufficient to bring this case within the "tolerated
intruder" doctrine, but that the "attractiveness" of the car was not sufficient to
bring it within the "attractive nuisance" doctrine.' Concerning itself solely with
a duty based upon past habitual use of the premises, the court then stated that
the origin of this duty is the probability, known to the possessor, of children
being present, making it necessary for him to consider their probable presence in
regulating his own conduct.r Under such a theory the duty owing a child trespasser whose presence is known or anticipated because of former trespasses, is
no different from that owing an adult trespasser under like circumstances,
namely, a duty to use due care in performing acts which will probably increase
the dangerousness of his position. The extent of this duty has sometimes been
roughly defined by saying that the possessor of land is liable to a trespasser for
active negligence in doing a present act, but not for passive negligence in per-

'Palmer v. Gordon, 173 Mass. 410, 53 N. E. 9o9 (i899); Palmer v.
Oregon etc. R. R. Co., 34 Utah 466, 98 Pac. 689 (I9O8).
'Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. MacDonald, 152 U. S. 262, 14 Sup. Ct. 61g (1893);
Young v. Clark, i6 Utah 42, 50 Pac. 832 (1897) ; see Fitzpatrick v. Penfield,
267 Pa. 564, 571, 109 At]. 653, 656 (1920). That there is a duty in this situation is admitted even in jurisdictions where the "attractive nuisance" doctrine
is rejected, as for instance Pennsylvania: Balser v. Young, 72 Pa. Super. 502
(919).
' McKiddy v. Des Moines Elec. Co..

202 Iowa 225, 2o6 N. W. 815 (1926);
Keffe v. Milwaukee etc. Ry. Co., 21 Minn. 207 (1875).
Contra: Wheeling
etc. R. R. Co. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N. W. 66 (I9o7) ; Thompson v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 218 Pa. 444, 67 Atl. 768 (igo7).
'A standing freight car has been held not an "attractive nuisance," Buddy
v. Union Terminal Ry. Co., 276 Mo. 276, 2o7 S. W. 821 (i918); Bogden v.
Los Angeles Ry. Co., 59 Utah 505, 205 Pac. 571 (1922).
Contra: Cahill v.
Stone & Co., 153 Cal. 571, 96 Pac. 84 (i9o8).
Nor is a moving train an
"attractive nuisance," Swartwood's Guardian v. Louisville etc. R. R. Co., 129
Ky. 247, III S. W. 305 (19o8).
'Hardy v. Missouri Pac. R. R. Co., 266 Fed. 86o (C. C. A. 8th, I92o);
Ramsay v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., 295 Ill. 395, 129 N. E. 127 092o);
Hudson, op. cit. supra note 2, at 844; see principal case, at 931.
'Underwood v. Western etc. R. R. Co., IO5 Ga. 48, 31 S. E. 123 C1898) ;
Hojecki v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co., 283 Pa. 444, 129 Atl. 327 (1925);
Peaslee, Duty to Seen Trespassers (1914), 27 HARv. L. REV. 403; TORTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst., 1929) §§ 204-208.
"Due care," however, means
reasonable care under the circumstances known to the defendant, and if the
probable presence of a child is one of these circumstances the degree of care
required will be proportionately increased: see Dobbins v. Missouri etc. R. R.
Co., 91 Tex. 6o, 62, 41 S. W. 62 (i8g).
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mitting the premises to exist in their present condition. Although in the instant
case the injury seems in one sense to have resulted from a condition existing
when the child entered, and not under defendant's control after the child came
within the zone of danger, nevertheless the condition was one created by the
defendant with knowledge that children would probably be imperiled by the
potential danger of the insecurely fastened car. Consequently the decision of
the court that this was active negligence within the duty owing a mere trespasser
is of aid in accurately delimiting the rather indistinct line between actionable
and non-actionable forms of conduct eventually resulting in injury to habitual
10
child intruders

WILLS-CONsTRucTIoN-DIsTRIBUTION PER STIRPES OR PER CAPITATestator bequeathed his estate "to my sister A . . . ; to all the living children
of my deceased half-brother B . . . -and to C . . . share and share alike."
The three children of the testator's half-brother B, each claimed one-fifth of
the estate. Held (one judge dissenting), that the three children constituted a
class entitled to one-third of the estate. In re Rauschenplait's Estate, 291 Pac.
432 (Cal. 193o).
When a testator names some beneficiaries individually and identifies others
as a class by their relationship to a common ancestor, the question arises-do
the members of the class share equally with the named beneficiaries, or do they
take as a class a share equal to that of each named legatee? The classic rule
of construction provided for distribution per capita irrespective of the degree
of their relationship to the testator or of whether there was any relationship
at all.' If, however, any part of the will evidenced a "faint glimpse" of an
intention for stirpital distribution, it was heeded.' In the United States this
mode of construction has had somewhat doubtful support! It has been openly
rejected by some courts' in construing wills in which the beneficiaries are the
9
Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N. H. 257, 44 Atl. 8o9 (1897); Sharp
Realty Co. v. Forsha, 122 Ohio St. 368, 171 N. E. 598 (1930) ; Ollis v. Houston
etc. Ry. Co., 31 Tex. Civ. App. 6oi, 73 S. W. 30 (1903).
"Recovery was allowed in Ramsay v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., supra
note 7 (sand in bin) ; Union etc. Co. v. Lunsford, 189 Ky. 785, 225 S. W. 741
(192o) (unprotected electric wires) ; Harriman v. Pittsburg, etc. Ry. Co., 45
(unexploded signal torpedo); Balser v.
Ohio St. II, 12 N. E. 451 (887)
Young, supra note 4 (lumber pile). Recovery was denied in Kelly v. Benas,
(lumber pile); Hanfan, Adm'r v. Ehrlich,
217 Mo. I, i16 S. W. 557 (199o)
1O2 Ohio St. 176, 131 N. E. 5o4 (I92I) (sand pit).

12 JARMAN, WILLS (6th ed. 191o)
'Ibid. 1712.

§§

1711, 1712.

'See It re Leverich's Will, 135 Misc. 777, 783, 238 N. Y. Supp. 533, 538
('929).
'Fraser v. Dillon, 78 Ga. 474, 3 S. E. 695 (1887) ; Ferrer v. Pyne, 81 N. Y.
281 (188o) ; Minter's Appeal, 40 Pa. iII (186i).

RECENT CASES
testator's kin and the method of distribution set out by intestacy statutes ' has
been followed. Accordingly, where a named beneficiary and the parent' of
the members of the class are related to the testator in the same degree, distribution is made per stirpes; ' where the beneficiaries are all related in the
same degree,8 or the parent is included,9 distribution is made per capita. Other
courts purport to follow the older rule, but in fact reduce it to a nullity by
requiring only very slight evidence of an intent to distribute in accordance
with intestacy provisions0
There are others which follow the classic rule
as a general principle' and allow of exception only upon explicit reference
to the statutes 2 However, the testator's failure to name individually all of
the beneficiaries seems to negative an intention to treat them equally, and since
the provisions of intestacy statutes admittedly follow the "natural disposition
of mankind," " an analogy to them would seem more nearly to accord with
the testator's unexpressed intention. This is the conclusion reached by the
court in the instant case," and it seems essentially the correct one. But the
' For the provisions made by such statutes, see INTESTATE ACT OF 1917,

P. L. 429, §§ 7, 9.
6 Stirpital distribution is substitutional, the children taking what the parent
would take if living, and so is not accurately made where the parent is'living.
In cases where it has been made there has been a marked evidence in the whole
of the context to treat the children as a class. Risk's Appeal, 52 Pa. 269 (1886)
Dubois v. House, 294 S. W. 935 (Tex., 1927).

'Rivenett v. Bourquin, 53 Mich. io. I8 N. W. 537 (1884); Vincent v.
Newhouse, 83 N. Y. 505 (18801) ; Kline's Estate, 38 Pa. Super. 582 (i9o9);
2 Sc HOULER, WILLS (Blakemore's ed. 1923) § io36.

Bailey v. Orange Memorial Hospital, io2 Atl. 7 (N. J. Eq. 1917) ; Scott's
Estate, 163 Pa. 165, 29 Atl. 877 (0894).
"n re Morrison's Estate, 138 Cal. 401, 71 Pac. 453 (1903).
"Raymond v. Hillhouse, 45 Conn. 467 (1878); Vincent v. Newhouse,
supra note 7.
U It has been argued that had the testator intended
distribution as in
intestacy he would not have made a will, see Mooney v. Purpus, 70 Ohio St.

57, 65, 70 N. E. 894, 896 (904)
(19o6).

; but see Sipe's Estate, 30 Pa. Super. 145, 150

" Distribution is generally made in accordance with the intestacy statutes
if the testator has referred to "heirs," on the ground that as the statutes are
necessary to determine the identity of the beneficiaries they may properly be
used to find the portions which the beneficiaries shall take: Perkins v. Stearns,
163 Mass. 247,39 N. E. ioi6 (1895) ; Branch v. DeVNolf, 38 R. I. 395, 95 Atl. 857
(1915) ; Collins v. Feather, 52 W. Va. 107, 43 S. E. 323 (902);
(1926) 75
U. oF PA. L. REv. 91. Contra: Records v. Fields, 155 Mo. 314, 55 S. W. 1021
(i9oo) ; cf. Rowley v. Currie, 94 N. J. Eq. 6o6, 12o At. 653 (1923).

See Ferrer v. Pyne, supra note 4, at 284.
"The court in its majority opinion expressly championed neither rule of
construction, but the argument of the dissenting judge for the classical rule
shows that it was before the court, and this coupled with the fact that analogy
to intestacy provisions is implicit in the decision warrant the inference that the
court prefers this rule of construction as applied to the facts of the case.
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classic rule of construction need not be entirely abandoned, for clearly analogy
to intestacy statutes is not possible unless the beneficiaries are related to the
testator. Where they are not, its application is helpful in construing vague
But when applied as a broad, general rule of construction, subject
language.'
to exceptions, its usefulness becomes doubtful since so used it seems only to
have added confusion to a field of law uncertain at best.
'it
re Kleeman, 61 Misc. 56o, 115 N. Y. Supp. 982 (1go8); Gamier v.
Gamier, 265 'Pa. 175, io8 Atl. 595 (1919).

